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In his seminal analysis of why the "haves" come out ahead, Marc Galanter identified a continuum of dispute resolving mechanisms, ranging from the informal mediation provided by ethnic clubs and associations to the formal, full-scale litigation offered in the state's centralized courts (Galanter 1974 ). Galanter's fundamental claim was that this universe of dispute resolving mechanisms should be assessed in terms of the disputants' characteristics: to understand the operation and outputs of any given arbitration or adjudication one must understand the nature of the conflict in which the parties are involved and the kind of resources that the parties possess.
Galanter explained why and how the demand for different kinds of dispute processing mattered. But what of the logic of supply? Independent of the motives and means that parties bring to specific dispute resolving venues, what can be said about the strategies that the suppliers of dispute resolving services use to attract disputes for resolution?
In this article, we examine the supply side of dispute resolution, focusing on the reasons and arguments that the state gives for attracting individuals to its judiciary. After briefly reviewing the demand-side view common in sociolegal studies, we develop an account of how the state attempts to persuade people to use the state's centralized courts rather than the local justice systems operating outside the state's direct control. We argue that the state will make claims about the superiority of its centralized courts, both in terms of greater efficiency and greater fairness. Moreover, we argue that these claims of superiority will be often directed toward those who may lose their disputes. By insisting that even losers will be better off in the state's centralized court system, the state strengthens its case for the superiority of its services.
On a deeper level, we also argue that the state will claim that its own courts are literally the only sensible options. That is, beyond asserting that local justice systems are inferior, we expect the state to insist that the alternatives to the official centralized courts are 2 incomprehensible. The claim of incomprehensibility complicates the process of marketing the centralized courts: the state not only seeks to persuade people that its courts are more efficient and fair than local competitors, but also attempts to convince people that no rational case can be made for pursuing different means of adjudication. Beneath its insistence on the superior value of its centralized courts, the state advances a series of claims that reserve the mantle of intelligibility for itself.
We test our account of the state's supply-side logic by examining the justifications given by New York state for the abolition of village and town courts. Originally created during the colonial era, the village and town courts in New York have long been targeted by state actors seeking to replace the local justice systems with a new network of state-run district courts.
Relying on official reports and transcripts from the past five decades, we assess the arguments that the New York state government has marshalled against local justice courts and in favor of new state courts. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the state government touts its own centralized courts not only by arguing that such courts do a better job of meeting the people's needs, but also by insisting that only the state's understanding of popular needs (and not the understanding of local people themselves) is coherent. In its efforts to establish new centralized courts, we find that the state claims (i) that it offers the best version of what the citizenry wants, and (ii) that it is impossible to conceive that people would want something other than what the state offers.
The Demand Side of Dispute Resolution
Over thirty-five years ago, Galanter published a now-classic explanation of how the attributes of individual parties affect the treatment of conflict (Galanter 1974) . Galanter 3 described a broad continuum of dispute resolving venues , extending from formal litigation to "appended" dispute settlement systems (where "parties settle among themselves with an eye to official rules and sanctions") and "private" remedy systems (where parties rely on "other norms and sanctions" independent from the official ones). Galanter argued that the placement of conflicts on the scale from "official" to "private" dispute settlement mechanisms depended primarily on the "density" of the relationship between the parties: "the more inclusive in life-space and temporal span a relationship between parties, the less likely it is that those parties will resort to the official system and more likely that the relationship will be regulated by some independent 'private' system" (130).
Galanter suggested that the characteristics of disputing parties not only determined whether their conflict found its way into a formal system of litigation, but also dictated the form and content of the conflict's settlement. As Galanter put it, parties that are "repeat players" (RPs) with "low stakes in the outcome of any one case" and with the "resources to pursue... longterm interests," can successfully "play the odds" in litigation, outmanoeuvring "one -shotter" parties (OSs) who are willing to sacrifice long-range gains for the sake of the case immediately at hand (98, 99) . It is this difference in individual resources and strategies that ultimately shapes outcomes: "Since they expect to litigate again, RPs can select to adjudicate (or appeal) those cases which they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules. On the other hand, OSs should be willing to trade off the possibility of making 'good law' for tangible gain. Thus, we would expect the body of 'precedent' cases -that is, those cases capable of influencing the outcome of future cases -to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to RP[s]" (101-2).
Galanter's emphasis on the motives and means of disputing parties influenced an entire generation of sociolegal scholarship (Glenn 2003) . Indeed, by situating disputants at the center of his analysis, Galanter helped give rise to the "Disputing Framework," the basic analytical approach used by sociolegal scholars to disaggregate "disputes into a sequence of discrete moments or successive stages, from the earliest experience of injury through, at least potentially, various stages of dispute claiming, formal action, and resolution." (Haltom & McCann 2004:74) .
By carefully investigating the processes of "naming, blaming, and claiming," sociolegal scholars have continuously refined Galanter's fundamental insight and developed a sophisticated sense of how dispute resolving systems are driven by demand (Felstiner et al 1980-81; Mather & Yngvesson 1980-81; Haltom & McCann 2004:73-99) .
Justice for Sale
In this article, we step away from the conventional sociolegal emphasis on the demand for dispute settlement and focus on questions of supply. Our specific concern is with two links in the long chain of different dispute resolving mechanisms: we are interested in how the state goes about attracting individuals to its centralized courts and away from local justice systems outside direct state control. By concentrating on the ways in which the state "sells" its centralized courts, we do not intend to displace the substantial body of work that has grown up around Galanter's original contribution. Instead, our aim is to call attention to the factors that are missed by concentrating scholarly analysis on the genesis of disputes and the search for settlement. As essential as disputant characteristics may be, it is also important to recognize that the suppliers of dispute resolving services are not necessarily passive actors who remain idle while disputing parties work out the dynamics of demand.
To begin our examination of centralized courts and their local competitors, consider that the state is, in a general sense, always at work "selling" its official courts to the populace. It is true, of course, that the state can and does compel individuals to use its centralized courts. But it is also true that centralized courts, like other governmental agencies, critically depend on voluntary compliance. Obedience to the state's judiciary stems from the public's confidence in the courts -a confidence that is not produced by the threat of state force, but by popular acceptance of judicial authority (Geyh 2007; Gibson et al 1998; Brown & Wise 2004) . States plainly recognize the importance of public confidence and consequently require sitting judges to behave in ways that inspire respect for the law and compliance with judicial decisions. In the words of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. The prohibition applies to both professional and personal conduct.
A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny and accept freely and willingly restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen" (Code of Conduct for United States Judges 2009: Canon 2A). To maintain their position as authoritative arbiters, judges must always attend to how their actions (in both substance and appearance) affect the public's willingness to use the centralized court system. The work of Martin Shapiro provides a detailed guide for thinking about how the state attempts to market its centralized courts (Shapiro 1981 ; see also Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002) .
Shapiro begins by arguing that all courts are triadic in structure: they exist because two parties engaged in conflict seek judgement from a third. A critical instability in this triad inevitably occurs at the point of decision, for "when the third decides in favor of one of the two disputants, a shift occurs from the triad to a structure that is perceived by the loser as two against one," leaving the loser with little incentive to obey the judgement (Shapiro 1981:4) . The oldest response to this two-against-one problem is to maximize consent. If the specific parties in a case 6 are jointly permitted to select the law applicable to their dispute as well as to pick the judge who will hear their dispute, then the "eventual loser" is placed in a position of "having consented to the judgement rather than having had it imposed upon him" (Shapiro 1981:4) . Individuals may be sold on a court if they are allowed to buy in.
As Shapiro notes, however, the great difficulty that the modern state faces is that its centralized courts are not structured to elicit individual consent in its most direct and complete form. "The most purely consensual situation is one in which disputants choose who shall assist them in formulating a rule and who shall decide the case under it, as the Romans initially did" (Shapiro 1981:6) . Modern courts often depart from this purely consensual model in important ways. Rather than being allowed to select and develop the decision making rule for their specific dispute, litigants in the state's centralized courts typically confront an already developed set of laws. Moreover, rather than being allowed to choose the arbiter who will render judgement in their particular case, litigants are often faced with a judge already appointed by the state. The public must be willing to use and obey the state's centralized courts if these courts are to be successful, and yet these courts are, by virtue of their design, frequently tough to sell to the public. With the priorities and commitments of both law and judge established by the state rather than by the parties themselves, defeat in court may easily look less like the rendering of justice than like the victorious litigant and the judge ganging up against the losing party. Or, as Shapiro puts it, "Contemporary courts are involved in a permanent crisis because they have moved very far along the routes of law and office from the basic consensual triad that provides their essential social logic" (Shapiro 1981:8) .
How, then, does the state make an effective pitch for its centralized courts? According to Shapiro, one method is to inject some elements of consent into the official system. Although 7 courts remain centralized under the control of the state and the most complete forms of direct consent are no longer available, it is possible to introduce some elements of consent by allowing, among other things, for the popular election of judges. Individual litigants will not be able to pick a judge all on their own nor will the litigants be able to dictate the choice of relevant law.
But if they are allowed to participate in judicial selection to some extent, then litigants will have been given reason to support the courts' decisions.
A somewhat different -and, according to Shapiro, far more important -method of persuading people to accept centralized courts is to argue that the very factors which move the state's courts away from pure consent also provide these courts with important advantages. This method of marketing may be developed along several different lines. Pre-existing law and stateemployed judges can be defended as means for ensuring that arbiters in the centralized courts have not been bribed by (or otherwise made dependent upon) one of the disputing parties. More broadly, the independence of state law and state judges allows centralized courts to be justified as mechanisms for providing levels of efficiency and fairness unavailable in other dispute processing venues. The state-determined uniformity and stability of the centralized courts will readily appeal to those parties that find themselves on the losing end of a local justice system outside of the state's control. These same features can be used to mollify parties defeated in the centralized courts themselves: losers are assured that their rights, as citizens of the national polity, have been considered in their most general and universal form.
This way of packaging centralized courts does not change the fact that these courts are largely created and maintained by the state, and operate many steps away from pure consent.
"When two parties must go to a third who is an officer," Shapiro writes, "it is as evident to them as to the observer that they are no longer going to a disinterested third. Instead, they are 8 introducing a third interest: that of the government, the church, the landowner, or whoever else appoints the official" (Shapiro 1981:18) . But if the rhetoric of independence does not change the basic structure of the state's centralized courts, it nonetheless allows the argument to be made that such courts are more fair and efficient than local justice systems tied to the vagaries of provincial interests.
We follow Shapiro in expecting the case for centralized courts to be made by invoking the virtues that flow from independence. Yet we do not anticipate that the core of the state's procourt argument will be solely about fairness or efficiency. There is an additional factor that must be taken into account. As James Scott argues, the modern state pursues its interests using a particular epistemology suited to its purpose (Scott 1998) . The state "sees" society in terms of simplified maps that highlight the information necessary for the official identification, organization, and control of citizens. According to Scott, these simplified maps are not mere guides: they are ways of perceiving that furnish the essential means by which the state governs.
The state and the citizenry interact through clashing frames of reference, with formal official systems butting up against informal local ways that remain cognitively "illegible" from the state's perspective.
Although Scott generally locates the line between different epistemologies on the border between state and civil society, his argument applies to any domain organized to serve purposes different from those pursued by the central state. Depending on context and circumstance, public institutions and private practices may both appear indecipherable to state actors. Indeed, studies suggest that the state has often seen local courts of limited jurisdiction in precisely this way (Silbey 1981) . From the state's perspective, local justice systems may seem to be irrational because their highly particularistic, procedurally irregular work departs from the rule-bound, predictable processes of the state's centralized courts.
In our view, the arguments made by Scott and Silbey significantly complicate the marketing of the state's centralized courts. The initial challenge of overcoming the distance between official courts and pure consent is made more difficult by the epistemological distance between the state and its would-be litigants. Advocates of centralized courts must not only persuade disputing parties that the independence of law and judges makes for an efficient and fair process superior to the services offered by local courts, but also that "efficiency" and "fairness" should themselves be thought about in a new way. The successful packaging of centralized courts requires, in other words, the substitution of independence for more direct forms of consent and the displacement of local knowledge by the theories and logics of the state. This is not to say that the contest between centralized courts and local alternatives will be conducted exclusively in terms of efficiency, fairness, and assertions of incomprehensibility.
The effort to advance centralized courts will, like any political effort, also engage contending groups and their conflicting material interests. Yet the presence of competing ambitions and claims for power does not mean that analysis should be reduced to the clash of interest groups.
Politics virtually "always involve[s] efforts by political actors to calculate, exert, and resist the effects of various constraints and incentives upon their own existing interests and those of others." And yet "politics also involves ongoing efforts to persuade others via normative arguments that they should think of themselves and their interests differently than they do" (Smith 1992:16, emphasis original) . To focus on how the state "sells" individuals on its institutions is to call attention to the dimension of politics concerned with altering the sense competing parties have of the issues at stake.
The New York State Justice Courts
To test our account of the state's supply-side logic we turn to the case of the New York state town and village courts. New York's "Justice Courts," as they are also known, are a collection of more than 1250 town and village courts scattered throughout the state. The Justice Courts are administered by their respective municipalities. The judges who preside over these courts must live in the same town or village that they serve and are elected by its residents.
While the bulk of their work is comprised of traffic cases, the Justice Courts hear a range of civil matters, as well as misdemeanours and preliminary hearings for more serious criminal matters.
The Justice Courts originate from the British Justice of the Peace tradition and, as a result, judges on these courts are not required to be lawyers. In fact, less than a majority of the judges serving on the Justice Courts have law degrees.
On a number of occasions over the past 50 years, New York state has attempted to reform the Justice Courts and replace them with a centralized state-run system. The extended reform effort has generated a considerable body of evidence about the state's pro-courts "sales pitch," allowing us to see how the state has tried to persuade local residents to abandon their own institutions of dispute resolution for the sake of new state-run alternatives. In recent years, the state has stepped up its efforts and staged a series of legislative and public hearings designed to advance reform. The recent spate of hearings provide even more evidence of state action and permit us to assess the state's marketing plans in detail.
We recognize at the outset that questions may be raised by our proposal to examine the Justice Courts with an analytical framework originally developed with reference to conditions quite different from those of our case study. For example, we rely on Scott's assertion that an epistemological distance separates state perspectives from those of civil society, and we claim that this distance complicates the state's efforts to sell its courts. Since Scott drew his evidence of epistemological distance from colonial contexts, one might well question the applicability of his argument to our case. Similar doubts may also attend our reliance on Shapiro. Shapiro wrote about instances in which fledgling states promoted centralized courts as replacements for preexisting, wholly independent courts operating at the local level. By contrast, the New York State Justice Courts have some links to the well-established central administration that is seeking to reform them. One may properly say that the Justice Courts are "outside" the state system in the sense that their judges originate from, and are selected and controlled by, the localities who fund them. The state nonetheless possesses a limited degree of authority over the Justice Courts via the state's Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Office of the Comptroller. 1 Although it is true that the Justice Courts operate at quite a distance from the central administration, it is also true that New York is simply not in the same position as a new state attempting to assert authority over the local provinces for the first time.
We acknowledge these doubts and suggest that that they actually point toward the potential strength of our analysis. Although we begin with scholarly arguments developed in the context of state formation, our aim is to develop a theory of supply side logic that is applicable more broadly. Taken together, the work of Scott and Shapiro tell us to expect claims of efficiency, fairness, and incomprehensibility whenever states are trying to establish their courts during formative periods. If we find similar claims in a different context, then we will have
shown that the official marketing of courts has similar characteristics across a range of circumstances. Thus, it is partly because New York state offers a novel set of conditions that it provides a good test for our general theory about how official courts are "sold."
We also recognize that our application of Scott's theory raises legitimate questions about how we are characterizing the state given that actors on either sides of this debate have linkages to both the state and civil society. For example, in New York state some of the most vocal advocates of centralized courts are non-state actors such as representatives of professional law associations, domestic violence organizations, and court reform groups. As noted above, our reading of Scott stresses the significance of adopting a state perspective -a perspective that "sees" in terms conducive to centralized governance and that finds local ways of knowing illegible. It is our contention that reformers, though they need not be state actors themselves, nevertheless adopt a state perspective by arguing for centralized courts that are grounded in conceptualizations of efficiency and fairness that serve the state's purposes. In contrast, the defenders of the Justice Courts adopt a different perspective by arguing for a justice system grounded in conceptualizations of efficiency and fairness that stress the value of local ways of knowing and doing. Therefore for our purposes, and in keeping with Scott's approach, we characterize "the state" as a perspective and not a fixed institutional identity, acknowledging that the adoption of a state perspective with respect to justice delivery need not imply alignment with the state's interests in all cases.
Finally, we acknowledge that the distance between state and local perspectives may also involve material conflicts between (i) a locality that enjoys the monetary rewards that follow from the collection of traffic and parking violations, and (ii) a state that seeks to capture that revenue for itself. The fight over funds raises the prospect that assertions about fairness and efficiency in the reform debate are nothing more than a cover for the protection of material interests. And, indeed, one can find some material in the records supporting this view.
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We argue, however, that such an explanation is quite incomplete. The fiscal incentives to maintain control over the local courts varies greatly across localities and actors in New York. 3 As several defenders of the Justice Courts note, if monetary concerns were their only motivation they would in fact support state efforts to take over the administration of local justice. An exclusive focus on material interests simply does not explain why actors who do not benefit materially still defend the courts. This suggests that the arguments framed in terms of efficiency and fairness actually do address --as participants in the debate themselves maintain --genuine bones of contention. Material interests no doubt shape the political struggle; but efforts to persuade actors to think about their interests in different ways are also important.
Before beginning our analysis, a few orienting remarks may be of use. We examine official reports and public hearing transcripts relating to Justice Court reform over a more than 50 year period (1953-present) . We present our case study in two periods. Although the two periods of our case study present a record of frustrated reform and shifting state strategies, our aim is not to provide a causal explanation for why the state's efforts have repeatedly failed or why the state's approach to reform has changed over time. Instead we aim to show that regardless of the state's failures and changing strategies, the same features are present in its efforts to convince the people of the superiority of the state's preferred system of justice. The analysis is presented as follows. Taking each reform period in turn, we begin with an overview of the central events and outcomes, followed by our analysis of key arguments. Our analysis of the more recent reform period is more detailed because it is characterized by a more focused attention on the Justice Courts alone instead of a broader reform agenda. We do not try to valorize or romanticize the town and village courts as some of their defenders do, nor do we specifically endorse any of the state's preferred reform strategies or claims. Our argument leaves aside questions about which system of justice is best and focuses instead on the state's efforts to portray the Justice Courts as inefficient, unfair, and ultimately unintelligible to a public that has consistently expressed its attachment to its local systems.
A final word on method. Our analysis of documents and transcripts is guided by framing theory which aims to explain "the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007: 104) . More specifically, to frame is "to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993: 52) . Although framing research often focuses on the effects that elite frames have on citizens' attitudes and beliefs (Kinder 2003 , Jacoby 2000 , Kinder and Sanders 1996 , Nelson and Kinder 1996 , other work has also shown that citizens adopt the frames they learn in discussion with other citizens (Gamson 1992 , Druckman and Nelson 2003 , Walsh 2003 ,
and that social movement organizations use frames to mobilize and coordinate individuals around common understandings (Snow and Benford 1992 ).
Since ours is not an argument about the relative salience of competing frames or a causal argument that relates particular frames to particular reform outcomes, we do not undertake to count or systematically measure the frequency of different frames. Instead, we pay special attention to the concepts of efficiency, fairness, and incomprehensibility to see whether they appear and if so, how they are conceptualized. Throughout the documents and the reform debate, we find those who take the state perspective repeatedly adopt a framing of fairness as due process and efficiency as uninterrupted service in their efforts to sell the centralized courts. In the recent hearings especially, where the arguments of Justice Court defenders are explicit, we find alternate frames that we label fairness as contextualized process and efficiency as proximity that justify resistance to centralization and consolidation. Across both periods we find the state framing the local justice system as incomprehensible. The presence of these five frames suggests that the reform proposals and the reform debate conform to our expectation that centralized courts will be "sold" not only by claiming that the independence of the state's law and judges make for a more efficient and fair process, but also by insisting that the ideas of "efficiency" and "fairness" must themselves be made newly comprehensible.
The First Period of Reform
Over the past five decades there have been a number of state efforts to reform the Justice Courts. Each reform effort has failed -only to have another spring up. 4 The first period of reform that we discuss began with a major state effort in the 1950s and continued with another There is no need here to dwell upon the merits and demerits of the Justice of Peace system and the lay judge. The Subcommittee, however, regards the lay judge as one of the serious shortcomings inherent in our present system not because of any lack of good will or effort upon the part of those officers, but because it feels that it is essential that legal questions be determined by one trained in the law, since good will and hard work alone will often not solve legal problems. The Commission is still convinced of the soundness of those [prior] recommendations, but is not willing to jeopardize the opportunity for major improvements in all other courts by insistence at this time on its suggestions for these courts. 
Framing the Debate in the First Reform Period
The first efforts at reform had clearly not been successful. Our concern, however, is not about success, but about marketing. What sales pitch had the state used on behalf of its proposals?
Because the Tweed and Dominick Commissions both pursued broad reforms, their attempts to persuade the public on the specific question of the Justice Courts were somewhat limited.
Nonetheless several features of the state's logic and argumentation stand out. As expected, efficiency and fairness were key elements of the state's case for its courts. Framing fairness as due process, the state argued that only law-trained judges had the technical knowledge required to protect disputants' rights and that a professionalized judiciary made the state's proposed system the only sensible option. Framing efficiency as uninterrupted service, the state stressed the merits of easy coordination between different actors in the system (probation officers, prosecutors, administrators etc.), and argued that a centralized system of courts was uniquely suited to the task of local justice delivery.
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The commission reports all rejected the alternative view that lay judges had valuable skills and qualifications relevant to the administration of justice (an alternative view that implied altogether different conceptions of fairness and efficiency). Indeed, this alternative view was so completely dismissed that its emphasis on local control and local knowledge was never actually articulated in the official reports as a coherent position to be opposed. Even after encountering significant local opposition to the state proposal -and in the case of the Tweed Commission, even after bowing to the local opposition -reformers remained absolutely convinced that their courts were not only superior but also uniquely appropriate to the task of local justice. That reformers were framing the local justice system as incomprehensible was made clear by this conviction as well as their confidence that local attachments to the Justice Courts would simply fade away over time.
The Second Period of Reform
In the last decade renewed reform efforts have provided the impetus for numerous commissions and public hearings. This recent period is distinct because instead of taking an "abolish and replace" position like the Tweed and Dominick Commissions, it is dominated by a "consolidate and contain" strategy for extending state control over local justice. exclusively to a review of the town and village courts. In keeping with the general reform approach of the second period, it outlined a proposal featuring 11 a legally enforceable consolidation plan, state-wide enforceable minimum standards, and an "opt-out" right to have misdemeanor cases heard by an attorney judge. In pursuing a compromise strategy that stopped short of complete replacement of the local justice system, the Dunne Commission claimed to be finding a way "to achieve the necessary improvements without abandoning the system entirely, something that we believe there is no consensus or political will to do" (Special Commission 2008: 107) . Thus the Dunne Commission expressed a somewhat chastened tone that captured the spirit of all of the second-period reform recommendations.
Framing the Debate in the Second Reform Period
Despite taking a different approach than that of the first-period reforms, the second-period reforms showed the state continuing to emphasize the merits of its alternative in terms of efficiency and fairness. Furthermore, in an effort to persuade a public attached to local control of their courts that a more centralized state system was the only sensible way to deliver justice, the state continued to advance particular understandings of efficiency and fairness that clashed with those of Justice Court defenders. The clash was evident in the very framing of the Dunne report which stressed that the Justice Courts' very configuration defied any rational logic. Using language like "overabundant," "redundant," "fragmented," "current jumble," and "ad hoc" to describe the Justice Courts, reformers argued that measures were needed to establish an orderly was not only an inefficient use of resources, but also the reason why service delivery suffered and court users found local processing unreliable. Thus, even as the state adopted a much less ambitious position regarding local justice reform, it continued to "market" its proposals as a matter of bringing efficiency and fairness to an unintelligible jumble of local practices.
The official sales pitch for state-run courts was repeatedly advanced in public testimony at six public hearings convened by the assembly, the senate, and the Dunne Commission itself.
As we demonstrate below, these public hearings were dominated by claims of efficiency and fairness arrayed around an epistemological chasm separating proponents of reforms from 24 defenders of the existing system. Unlike the reports, these hearings allow us to examine the state's sales pitch for reform when located in direct exchange with opponents and to examine for the first time the alternate conceptions of efficiency and fairness these opponents adopt.
Efficiency Frames in the Public Hearings
Advocates of structural change in the second-wave reform public hearings made repeated claims about the efficiency of a centralized or consolidated system. As in the first reform period this argument focused on the way a more centralized system of courts would be easier to centralized scheme, and not the current system, would provide true "access to justice."
I have heard testimony here that the Justice Courts will provide access -close access.
That's nonsense. Most town and village Justice Courts have no access, except on the one night a week that they sit, and one night a month, or the one afternoon a month, when the district attorney is present. ... They do not provide access.
(Assembly Hearing 2006: 294)
Thus reformers made their case by emphasizing that centralization, or at least consolidation, was the only sensible approach to delivering efficiency as uninterrupted service.
To further stress the irrationality of the current system and the perspective that links efficiency to the local nature of the courts, reformers challenged the claim that the Justice Courts were truly local in two key ways. First, they argued the "localism" of the Justice Courts was highly overdetermined, since in many jurisdictions courts were found virtually across the street from each other. As Lubow elaborated, arguments based on proximity alone did not justify the status quo.
It's absurd. The duplication of services is ridiculous. It was created at a time when traveling five miles between communities over dirt roads and through the woods and forests would take three to four hours. If you wagon it might take a whole day.
Today traveling five miles takes five minutes. ... It's a waste of resources. Second, reformers noted that "local justice" was not particularly local any longer, especially now that the Justice Courts heard such a large number of traffic cases. In reality, many court users travelled long distances to contest speeding or parking tickets they had received while passing through or visiting a locality. 12 As Barbara Bartoletti of the League of Women Voters contended, the notion that Justice Courts were servicing mainly the residents of their town or village was simply not accurate.
Most litigants already travel to so-called local courts. Anyone who has gotten a traffic ticket on their way to Rochester or Buffalo and has to return somewhere between Rochester and Utica to attend a local court know of that experience.
(Special Commission 2007b: 53)
The reformers' efficiency arguments were contested by local actors who conceptualized efficiency and access to justice from the perspective of on-the-ground court users adopting what we call the efficiency as proximity frame. Defenders of the Justice Courts emphasized the benefits of physical proximity, evening hours, and free parking -all of which help suit local courts to user needs. Access was particularly important, defenders argued, in rural areas where social services were limited. Claiming that the Justice Courts served a unique purpose in these rural jurisdictions, defenders like Hon. Schneider-Dennenberg, Gallatin Town Judge, insisted that "often times the courts are the first contact in which extreme family or neighborhood dysfunction is indentified" (Special Commission 2007b: 242) . 13 Defenders also emphasized that without the local courts operating on flexible hours and the willingness of local magistrates to be on call for late night arraignments, defendants would have to be transported to other jurisdictions and detained for unnecessarily long periods. The Justice Court defenders thus advanced different notions of efficiency that made the state's arguments appear skewed and self-serving. This was perhaps best articulated in testimony from Hon. Vanderwater, a Van Buren town justice, in his testimony before the Dunne Commission public hearing in Albany:
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A justice system organized around the needs and best efficiencies for law enforcement, for defense, for prosecution would each likely be a little different.
The organization and efficiency of the local justice system should have as its most compelling considerations, first of all, the ability to provide justice, of course, as well as the needs and preferences of the community it serves, not the needs and preferences of the people that serve the community, if push comes to shove.
(Special Commission 2007b: 145)
Constantly repeating their rallying cry that the Justice Courts were the "courts closest to the people," 14 defenders of the status quo argued that centralization and consolidation would compromise the courts' central value which they framed in terms of efficiency as proximity.
Fairness Frames in the Public Hearings
In addition to claims about efficiency, the second-period public hearings prominently featured arguments about fairness. The state perspective again framed fairness as due process, stressing objectivity, and equal treatment and portraying the local aspects of the courts as a threat to fairness so defined. While they were sympathetic to the intentions of local justices, reformers believed local judges were approaching their task in inappropriate ways and that they were structurally positioned to be unable to make fair judgements due to their lack of professional legal training. Lubow stated:
These are people that come from a system where they were the justice of the peace.
They were members of their town board. They were protectors of the community.
They were not impartial judges. They are not people who consider the evidence in a cold sometimes hard way and come to a legal decision. They're the people that have to go to the coffee shop the next morning and say 'Why the heck did you let that kid out of jail? Why didn't you put him in jail? We know he broke into the house.' The political and personal pressure on those judges is incredible. Framing the problem in this way suggested two ways that state run courts would be more sensible. First, because the reformers equated fairness with distance, objectivity, and equal treatment for all, they argued that centralization or consolidation would increase fairness by reducing the extent to which judges were locally rooted (though they would still be elected as is the common practice in New York state). Second, reformers argued that requiring or increasing the number of lawyer judges would ensure that adjudicators would, because of their professional training, be unbiased and therefore fair.
This call for credentialed judges elicited a great deal of discussion featuring competing notions of fairness (the discussion was extensive even though the reform proposals ultimately left the role of non-lawyer judges unchanged I would put almost any decision in your hands, and feel comfortable about your ability to make that. 17 The idea that you would be able to admit documents into evidence in a way that is appropriate in a criminal proceeding, and have -you know, that seems to me, a really big thing to expect someone to bite off, who does not have the legal training. And since I would have to wait a decade from getting out of law school to be able to sit there to do that, it does strike me as odd that it's being done in places in this State without that training. suggesting there was no intelligible reason, aside from feasibility, to oppose lawyer judges or in other words, that there was no way to conceptualize fairness except as due process.
In actuality there was a positive defense of non-lawyer judges and it was grounded in a conception of fairness that expressed a fundamentally different approach to dispute processing than that advocated by state-centered reformers. Justice Court defenders reasoned that fairness did not always require equal treatment in the way assumed by the fairness as due process frame.
From this perspective the relevance of legal training for judges was often called into question, as it was by Judge Kramer, Delaware Town Justice when he stated: "I really don't fully understand the rationale of those who feel a law degree should be a requirement for town and village justices" (Special Commission 2007d: 153) . The alternate framing of fairness favored by Justice
Court defenders implied that lay judges were in fact most appropriate for the task. As Kevin
Crawford of the Association of Towns of the State of New York argued, it was "not just out of necessity" that non-lawyer judges should remain but also because they were equally, and perhaps more, likely than lawyer judges to possess the particular forms of local knowledge integral to the administration of local justice (Senate Hearing 2007: 184) . On this view, local knowledge of culture, place, and people might call for unequal treatment in order to arrive at decisions that the local community considered fair. Thus the local perspective adopted a framing of fairness as contextualized process that stressed benefits of lay judges and the local knowledge they possess. Bit by bit, one could argue that we are reconstructing that which the patriots so nobly fought against those many years ago. To deny the people local control over their own courts and their own judges is far more important to our democracy than are isolated instances of misjudgement.
(Special Commission 2007e: 268) Any constraints on judicial qualifications (especially the requirement of lawyer judges) limited the ability of the people to choose their own adjudicators. As Justice Vanderwater claimed, the insistence that judicial qualifications be increased threatened to de-legitimize the local courts in the eyes of the community:
The requirement of a law degree is an unnecessary barrier to running for town or village judges. Unnecessary barriers to running for office, regardless of the motive, are harmful to the basic fundamentals of democracy.
(Special Commission 2007b: 154) Therefore, it was precisely the feature that reformers saw as the central problem with local justice (i.e., unequal treatment of litigants) that defenders highlighted as its great benefit by framing fairness as contextualized process. Furthermore, defenders not only saw reformist strategies to make local courts "more fair" on their own terms as counterproductive but also as a threat to the very legitimacy of local courts rooted in democratic consent. The packaging of the centralized state courts in terms of fairness involved presenting altogether different conceptions of judicial legitimacy and fairness as the only ones that could be considered sensible.
Conclusion
We began by raising a question about the logic of supply: what arguments and claims does the state make as it attempts to "sell" its own centralized courts to disputing parties?
Drawing on the existing literature, we argued that the state would, in part, make the pitch for its judiciary by claiming the centralized courts are more efficient and fair than any alternatives. We also argued, however, that these claims of superiority would be complicated by an epistemological distance between the state and the would-be litigants it hoped to attract.
Centralized courts are structured and understood in the context of state interests and purposes; as a result, the state considers its own dispute processing services to be the only possible coherent option. From this perspective, other forms of dispute resolution, designed to suit the interests and purposes of other actors, are bound to be seen as incomprehensible. Thus, in selling its centralized courts, we argue that the state must not only make relatively straightforward arguments about efficiency and fairness, but also find ways of persuading an audience of potential court users that the state itself considers to be irrational.
We then applied our theory to the case of New York, where the state has worked for many years to displace the local system of Justice Courts with its own state-run system of district courts. Examining the legislative and bureaucratic efforts of the past five decades, we found that the state has repeatedly made arguments about the superior efficiency and fairness of its courts, only to find these arguments blocked by local judges and community members whom think about efficiency, fairness, and the function of courts in a fundamentally different way. Even as the state has lowered its goals and sought to manage the Justice Courts rather than abolish them, the distance between the different ways of knowing at the state and local level remains apparent in the ongoing reform debates. The presence of these features and the import of this disconnect in the New York case suggests that our account has more generalized relevance. If efficiency, fairness, and different epistemologies are salient in a context where the cultural distance between state and local actors is relatively minute, and where the developed state already has partial involvement in the administration of local courts, there is good reason to expect to find these elements in other contexts. , it is the legislative and bureaucratic reform efforts that are most relevant for our purposes, for it is such attempts that are clearest indicators of the state's attempts to "sell" its way of processing disputes to a public accustomed and attached to the locally controlled courts. 5 The report concludes: "the Commission believes that the major improvements herein recommended deserve the full support of everyone who wishes to make progress rather than not to start at all" (1958: 18).
